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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Bifurcation of Claims for Trial
Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident, brought an action
for damages for personal injuries against both the driver and the owner of
the vehicle. The driver was alleged to have operated the vehicle negligently,
and the owner was alleged to have entrusted it to the driver although he,
the owner, knew that the driver was not qualified to operate it. The trial
judge ordered the claims against the two defendants to be heard separately.
On petition of the plaintiff for a writ to prohibit the judge from holding
separate hearings, the Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdic-
tion and issued the writ.'
The supreme court held that the driver and the owner were joint tortfeasors,
and that a joint tort gives rise to a single cause of action that cannot be split
or bifurcated, citing Sykes v. Wright.' However, the Sykes case is not authority
for the proposition that an action against joint tortfeasors cannot be bifur-
cated for trial because (1) Sykes was not an action by a plaintiff against joint
tortfeasors, and (2) any dictum in the Sykes case is superseded by section
2018(D) of the Oklahoma Pleading Code.'
In the Sykes case, the plaintiff sued one of several joint tortfeasors. After
recovering a judgment that, apparently, was paid, the plaintiff sued another
joint tortfeasor. The court held that a second suit could not be brought because
the plaintiff was entitled to only one satisfaction. In the syllabus the court
stated, "A joint tort gives rise to but a single cause of action, and a plaintiff
may proceed jointly or severally against each or all of the wrongdoers until
satisfaction of the cause of action has been received."' Because Sykes per-
mits a plaintiff to sue joint tortfeasors successively until he receives one satisfac-
tion, it does not prevent separate hearings before any judgment is rendered
where tortfeasors are joined as defendants in one action.
In Knight, the court also cited Retherford v. Halliburton Co.,- but this
case is not relevant because it does not involve joint tortfeasors. In Rether-
ford, the plaintiff recovered a judgment for some of her damages. After this
judgment was paid, she brought a second suit against the same defendant
for additional items of injury that resulted from the same wrongful act. The
court held that she could not bring two suits against the defendant where
he was guilty of only one wrong.
Section 2018(D) of the Oklahoma Pleading Code provides that a court "in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will
1. Knight v. McBee, 767 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1988) (Opala, V.C.J. concurring).
2. 201 Okla. 346, 205 P.2d 1156 (1949).
3. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2018(D) (Supp. 1988). See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2020(C) (Supp. 1988).
4. See Fraser, Joint Tortfeasors, 29 OKLA. B.J. 1933, 1936 (1958).
5. 572 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1978).
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be conducive to expedition and economy" may order a separate trial of any
claim or any issue in an action. This provision supersedes inconsistent holdings
in older cases, such as the Sykes case, because a statute that is copied from
another jurisdiction is adopted with the construction that is given to it by
the other jurisdiction.6 Thus, to avoid prejudice, unrelated claims that are
joined in a single action may be tried by different juries, and separate
judgments may be rendered on each claim. Also, to avoid prejudice, separate
trials of issues that are part of a single claim or of related claims that are
joined in one action may be ordered, but ordinarily the same jury should
hear all issues and a single judgment should be rendered.
7
From the opinion in the Knight case it is not clear what the trial court
ordered. However, separate hearings in regard to the driver's negligence and
the owner's negligent entrustment would avoid prejudice because evidence as
to the driver's prior negligence would not be admissible in regard to the driver's
liability, but it would be admissible in regard to the owner's negligent en-
trustment. Thus, the trial court should have been instructed to trifurcate the
issues for trial as indicated in the concurring opinion.8
George B. Fraser
David Ross Boyd Professor of Law Emeritus
6. See Gay v. Akil, 766 P.2d 985, 990 (Okla. 1988); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 659
P.2d 930, 934 n.7 (Okla. 1983); Harness v. Myers, 143 Okla. 147, 288 P. 285 (1930). Section
2018(D) is based on Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
7. See 9 C. WIorr & A. MMLER, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE § 2387 (1971).
8. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the severance of claims is within the discre-
tion of the trial court. Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1988).
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